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the right or the constitutional issues in the case.8 In other words, it
must be decided whether or not Greene has a right to sue or whether
his case presents a justiciable controversy before the other issues can be
considered. Moreover, because of the type of relief which Greene
sought-in effect, a mandatory injunction-the case really does present
a problem of the right of access to secret information 9
Despite the apparent crucial nature of this issue, the Government
concede it in oral argument before the Court, and, therefore, the opin-
ion correctly speaks only in terms of dicta. Nevertheless, the language
of the dicta is strong and unequivocal. But it is submitted that the
Court erred in its statements and overlooked fundamental constitution-
al law on this issue as pointed out in the above comment. The facts of
the Greene case were particularly difficult, and it is oftentimes the
situation that hard cases make bad law. In its zealous efforts to protect
a person of Greene's high caliber from discrimination through some-
what doubtful procedures, the Court simply overreached itself to
discuss issues upon which it declined to decide under the circumstances.
"Let us hope," as Justice Clark put it so aptly in his dissent, "that
the winds may change. If they do not the present temporary debacle
will turn into a rout of our internal security." 10
RICHARD G. ANDERSON
EQUITY'S POWER TO ENJOIN CRIMINAL ACTS
A matter of importance is the expansion of chancery jurisdiction
to include the enjoining of acts, such as the unlicensed practice of
dentistry, once considered punishable only at criminal law.' By as-
suming this power, equity courts deny the defendant his constitutional
8 1d. at 512. (dissenting opinion).
OId. at 512, n.3 . See also the strong language of Justice Clark: "In holding that
the Fifth Amendment protects Greene the Court ignores the basic consideration in
the case, namely, that no person, save the President, has a constitutional right to
access to government secrets. Even though such access is necessary for one to keep
a job in private industry, he is still not entitiled to the secrets. It matters not if
as a consequence he is unable to secure a specific job or loses one he presently en-
joys. The simple reason for this conclusion is that he has no constitutional right
to the secrets. If access to its secrets is granted by the Government it is entirely
permissive and may be revoked at any time.... The Court seems to hold that the
access granted Greene was for his benefit. It was not. Access was granted to se-
cure for the Government the supplies or services it needed." Id. at 513-14 (dissenting
opinion).
"'Id. at 524 (dissenting opinion).
'Nugent v. Stokes, 313 Ky. 131, 230 S.W.2d 6o9 (195o).
CASE COMMENTS
right to trial by jury. This denial has raised no storm of protest,2
and the courts have proceeded to extend the use of injunctions in
this field with the result that some courts have enjoined an act merely
because it is a crime.3 Essentially the same result is reached in other
jurisdictions by giving the public nuisance concept a wide application,
thereby classifying the criminal act as a public nuisnace.4
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.P5
was confronted with the problem of whether to enjoin a crime, there
being no statutory authority to do so. The defendant corporation
was a wholesale grocer and supplied retail stores with such drugs
and medicines as Anacin, Bufferin, Pepto-Bismol and Murine. A
Minnesota Statute6 prohibits the sale of drugs and medicines7 in es-
tablishments which do not employ a registered pharmacist and pro-
vides a penalty for its violation.8 Notwithstanding the fact that the
statute fails to provide injunctive relief for its violation, the State of
Minnesota as plaintiff contended that because the defendant em-
ployed no pharmacist, the sale of the above-mentioned items was
dangerous to the public health and should be enjoined. The trial
court denied the injunction with findings of fact that the items com-
plained of were drugs and medicines within the meaning of the
statute, but that there was no evidence from which the court could
2AMaloney, Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon, i Mercer L.
Rev. 1, 10 (1949).
'Ex parte Wood, 194 Cal. 49, 227 Pac. 908 (1923); State ex rel. Hopkins v. In-
dustrial Workers of the World, 113 Kan. S47, 214 Pac. 617 (1923); State ex rel.
Hopkins v. Howat, io9 Kan. 376, 198 Pac. 686 (1921). The court in each case cited
justified its holding by stating that harm was threatened to the public, but it is
evident that there existed no traditional ground for equity's jurisdiction. The an-
notation in 25 A.L.R. 1245 (1923) describes the holding of the Howat case as novel.
'Corte v. State, 259 Ala. 536, 67 So. 2d 782 (1953); State ex rel. Attorney Gen.
v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078 (19o7).
253 Minn. 236, 92 N.W.2d 1o3 (1958).
GMinn. Stat. Ann. §§ 151.15, 151.25 (1946).
7Section 151-25 of the Minnesota Statutes Annotated excludes those persons
handling harmless proprietary medicines from the provisions of chapter 151. Prior
to the instant case, no Minnesota court had determined whether or not the drugs
and medicines complained of were within that exception. It had been determined
by the Minnesota Supreme Court that the exception did not apply to sale of aspirin
and vitamins. Culver v. Nelson, 237 Minn. 65, 54 N.W.2d 7 (1952); State v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 184 Minn. 51, 237 N.W. 817 (1931). The trial court found in
accordance with the general rule that the items complained of were not excepted
from the provisions of the statute. There is some authority contra in at least one
jurisdiction. King v. Board of Medical Examiners, 65 Cal. App. 2d 644, 151 P.2d
282 (1944).
s"Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter... shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor...." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 151.29 (1946).
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find that sales of the drugs had resulted in harm to the public health.9
The court further found there was no evidence that a multiplicity of
suits to enforce the statute could be prevented only by an equity court,
for a criminal prosecution would reach exactly the same number of
persons and stores as might be reached in an equity proceeding.10 The
state appealed and the Supreme Court reversed for a new trial, reason-
ing as follows: any act which is inimical to the public health is a public
nuisance and should be enjoined; the legislature by enacting the
Pharmacy Act 1" adopted the position that the uncontrolled and un-
supervised sale of drugs is inimical to the public health; therefore
a showing that the defendant violated this statute makes a prima
facie case that he has created a public nuisance and should be en-
joined.12 It is submitted that this reasoning begs the question, in that
practically all statutes are enacted for the protection of the public
health, welfare, or property, and under the reasoning of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court the violation of any such statute would es-
tablish a prima facie case entitling the state to injunctive relief. Thus
the defendant, having violated a criminal statute, would find himself
with the burden of proving that he was entitled to a trial by jury.' 3
In remanding the case, the Supreme Court reversed the findings
of fact by the trial court that a criminal prosecution would not result
in a multiplicity of suits and that sale of the drugs had caused no harm
to the public. In so doing, the Supreme Court ignored the rule that
the appellate court will not interfere if the trial court's finding of
fact is supported by the evidence.14 On this ground, Chief Judge Dell
dissented.' 5
992 N.W.2d at so8.
"0Ibid.1 1Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 151 (1946).
292 N.W.2d at io5. While this is not an exact quote, the substance of the rea-
soning is identical to that used by the court in paragraph six of its syllabus.
1The Minn. State Const. art I, § 6 guarantees the defendant the right to trial
by jury in criminal prosecutions. In addition to the loss of trial by jury, the ac-
cused may suffer another disadvantage by trial in equity. It has been held that a
contempt proceeding against one who has violated a public nuisance injunction is
a civil rather than a criminal action. State v. Froelich, 316 Ill. 77, 146 N.E. 733
(1925). Thus the state only has to prove the defendant's guilt by a preponderance
of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. Annot., 49 A.L.R. 62o,
624 (1927).
"'Standard Oil Co. v. Bertelsen, 186 Minn. 483, 243 N.W. 701 (1932).
"92 N.W.2d at 114. Chief Judge Dell also differed from the majority on the
grounds that there was no showing of harm, either past, present or future; that
there had never been a criminal prosecution of the defendant; and that any as-
sertion that the violation would continue after one prosecution was mere specu-
lation. He also brought out the important point that the injunction would serve
CASE COMMENTS
In order to understand the position of the Minnesota Supreme
Court, it is necessary to examine the situations in which equity courts
have enjoined criminal acts. First, when the legislature has authorized
injunctive enforcement of a criminal statute,16 equity's jurisdiction
cannot be disputed.17
Secondly, equity is said to have jurisdiction when a statute de-
clares an act or practice illegal but provides no punishment.'5 Equity
takes jurisdiction on the ground that the act is illegal, but the remedy
at criminal law is inadequate. This assumption of jurisdiction by
equity courts seems a bit presumptuous, but a finding that the
criminal law remedy is inadequate is dearly more sound in these cases
than in a case such as Red Owl, where the statute provides a penalty
for its violation.
A third situation admitting of equity's jurisdiction is one in which
the act or practice complained of is by statute made a public nui-
sance,19 or in which the court finds the act or practice a nuisance per
se.2 0 Such a holding may be criticized only if, in the latter case, no
nuisance exists, but the court finds a nuisance as a matter of expe-
diency.
Finally, courts will enjoin an act as a nuisance when it is also a
crime for which a penalty is provided, for the fact that the nuisance
is also a crime does not bar equity jurisdiction which would otherwise
exist.2 ' The Supreme Court in the instant case necessarily attempted to
bring itself within this line of reasoning, because the Minnesota
statute provides for punishment and does not authorize injunctive
no practical purpose because the drugs and medicines could still be procured in
large quantities at any drug store. Id. at 114-16.
"These statutes have been frequently attacked on constitutional grounds, and,
except in New Jersey, have been upheld despite the argument that the defendant is
denied his right to trial by jury. McClintock, Equity § 164 at 445 (2d ed. 1948).
Actually the defendant is not denied his right to trial by jury when, as in Oklahoma,
the state constitution guarantees the right of trial by jury to defendants in all in-
direct contempt cases. Okla. Const. art. II § 25.
'7 Hudkins v. Arkansas State Bd. of Optometry, 2o8 Ark. 577, 187 S.W.2d 538
(1945); State ex rel. Wolfley v. Oster, 75 Idaho 472, 274 P.2d 829 0954) (unlicensed
practice of dentistry); State v. Howard, 214 Iowa 60, 241 N.W. 682 (1932) (un-
licensed practice of medicine).
"State ex rel. Missildine v. Jewett Market Co., 209 Iowa 567, 228 N.W. 288
(1929) (sale of aspirin by one not a registered pharmacist); State ex rel. Smith v. Mc-
Mahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929) (usury, civil remedy of forfeiture provided,
but no criminal penalty); Town of Linden v. Fisher, 154 Minn. 354, 191 N.W. 9Ol
(1923) (dance hall prohibited by city ordinance).
"'State v. Robertson, 63 N.M. 74, 313 P.2d 342 (1957).
City of New Orleans v. Lafon, 61 So. 2d 270 (La. 1952).
=McClintock, Equity § 164 at 443 (2d ed. 1948).
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relief. But most courts issuing an injunction in such a case realize
that the legislature has defined a crime and its punishment, and unless
some traditional ground for equity jurisdiction exists, the only effect
of the injunction is to threaten the defendant with (or subject him to)
contempt proceedings rather than trial by jury. These courts are
adamant in their requirement that the existence of a public nuisance
be conclusively proven. In a leading case on point,22 the defendant
was enjoined from practicing medicine without a license, the court
stating in its opinion: "In the case at bar, the People would not be
entitled to an injunction upon a mere showing that the statute had
been violated.... However, they go much further than that. They
allege facts showing that the acts of defendant imperil the health of
the people of the community, and will continue to cause irreparable
injury. ... 23 Similar reasoning is employed when the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant's acts are harmful to the public, but pleads no
facts from which specific harm may be found. In these cases, a de-
murrer has been sustained on the ground that the plaintiff has only
pleaded conclusions of law and has not shown the existence of a pub-
lic nuisance.24 The court in the instant case not only overlooked the
requirement that such facts be alleged and proved, but specifically
stated that even without a showing that the health of the community
had been imperiled, the state had established a prima facie case for
injunctive relief.25 This resort to expediency seems a weak premise
upon which to deny the defendant his right to trial by jury. The court
attempted to justify its action by stating that if the statute had pro-
vided for enforcement by injunction or had provided no penalty for
its violation, then injunctive relief would be proper and the defendant
could not complain of the loss of trial by jury.26 But if these con-
tingencies had been met, the case would have been decided on different
principles as previously discussed. It is submitted that this additional
statement by the court only emphasizes the weakness of the reasoning
employed.
The instant case establishes an unfortunate precedent for the
arbitrary denial of trial by jury to one charged with a criminal offense.
"It may be doubted whether such courage of equity [is] ... the better
JPeople ex tel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938).
2Id. at 445-46.
"People ex rel. Stephens v. Seccombe, 1o3 Cal. App. 306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930);
State v. Johnson, 26 N.M. 2o, 188 Pac. 1109 (1920).
"See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
292 N.W.2d at iii n.io.
